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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
FRANKLIN WARD OSTERHOUDT,) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 39287 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2007-2567 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Franklin Ward Osterhoudt asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Opinion No. 61 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2013) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). Mr Osterhoudt asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision affirming certain 
evidentiary rulings entered by the district court is inconsistent with prior precedent and 
this Court should grant his Petition for Review and ultimately vacate his conviction. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
A Grand Jury indicted Frank Osterhoudt in March of 2007 alleging that he 
committed five counts of lewd conduct, one count of incest, and one count of rape, 
naming his daughter, H.O., as the victim. (R., pp.22-25.) The five counts of lewd 
conduct were differentiated by location: Count I - "at or near 4567 N. 1100 E., Buhl" 
(hereinafter, Father's house); Count Ill - "at or near Balanced Rock" (hereinafter 
Balanced Rock); Count IV - "at or near Broadway St. in Buhl" (hereinafter, Shelly's 
house); Count V - "near the lambing shed at 4567 N. 1000 E." (hereinafter, Lambing 
Shed); Count VI - "in a vehicle" (hereinafter, Junkyard). Id. The Indictment alleged that 
each act (including Count II - incest, and Count VII - rape) occurred "on or about or 
between July 4, 2002, and November 30, 2006," with the exception of Count I which 
allegedly occurred "on or about or between November 1, 2006, and November 30, 
2006." Id. A warrant was issued and Mr. Osterhoudt was arrested two years later. 
(R., pp.26-31.) 
The case proceeded to trial; however, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and 
the court declared a mistrial. (R., pp.149-159.) 
Prior to the second trial, the State provided notice pursuant to IRE 404(b) that it 
would seek to present evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt committed other bad acts, and the 
defense filed a written objection. {R., pp.241-272.) After an evidentiary hearing, the 
District Court entered a written decision on the State's motion. (R., pp.289-302; 
Tr. 6/11/10, p.908, L.1 - p.999, L.6.) The district court identified the specific pieces of 
evidence sought by the State to be admitted as: 1) Mr. Osterhoudt fondled and licked 
H.O.'s vagina "well prior to July 4, 2002"; 2) Mr. Osterhoudt attempted to have sexual 
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intercourse with H.O. in the camper shell of his truck approximately three weeks prior to 
July 4, 2002; 3) Mr. Osterhoudt engaged in a course of conduct providing H.O. with 
methamphetamine in order to groom her for sex; and, 4) Mr. Osterhoudt fled from law 
enforcement. (R., p.290.) The district court held that the State failed to provide 
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt fondled and licked H.O.'s vagina prior to July 4, 2002; 
however, the State presented evidence that H.O. reported such a claim when she was 
five, and the court ruled that such evidence may become relevant if Mr. Osterhoudt 
presented evidence that H.O. recently fabricated the charged allegations. (R., pp.292-
294.) The court recognized that the State withdrew its notice of intent to provide 
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt attempted to have intercourse with H.O. prior to July 4, 
2002, and stated that such evidence would not be allowed at trial. (R., p.294.) The 
court held that evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt provided methamphetamine to H.O. 
beginning when she was fourteen was admissible as evidence of "grooming"; however, 
such evidence would only be relevant to the charged offense in Count I, which is the 
only charged offense that alleges dates entirely after Mr. Osterhoudt allegedly provided 
H.O. with methamphetamine. (R., pp.294-299.) Finally, the district court ruled that 
evidence Mr. Osterhoudt fled from law enforcement was admissible. (R., pp.299-301.) 
The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments of the second trial 
and the district court declared a mistrial. (R., pp.515-534.) 
Approximately one month prior to the third trial, the State provided Mr. Osterhoudt 
with approximately 400 minutes of audio recordings of conversations between 
Mr. Osterhoudt and various family members, and defense counsel filed a motion in 
limine to preclude the State from being able to present this evidence. (R., pp.600-606, 
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608-617, 731-733; Tr.1/31/11, p.5, L.12 - p.46, L.1) The district court held that the 
State provided the recordings too late and would not be allowed to present them in their 
case in chief; however, the court ruled that they may be admissible for impeachment 
purposes. (Tr.1/31/11, p.46, L.2 - p.50, L.22.) 
Approximately one week prior to the third trial, the State filed a Renewed Notice of 
Intent to Present 404(b) Evidence at Trial, and filed a supplemental brief in support of its 
motion. (R., pp.675-707.) Mr. Osterhoudt again objected to the presentation of such 
evidence. (R., pp.708-709.) The district court ruled that the previous court ruling (made 
prior to the second trial) would apply to this trial. (Tr.1/31/11, p.51, L.25 - p.69, L.25.) 
During the third trial, the State presented evidence that on November 30, 2006, 
H.O. disclosed the alleged abuse to the principal of Buhl High School, a Health and 
Welfare worker, and a Buhl Police Detective, she was taken into custody by Health and 
Welfare and, the next day, she was taken to the CARES center where she was 
physically examined and forensically interviewed. (Tr.2/1/11, p.9, L.18 - p.24, L.23 
(testimony of Mike Gemar, then principal of Buhl High School, testifying that he had a 
conversation with H.O. and contacted the police and Health and Welfare); Tr.2/1/11, 
p.34, L.5 - p.44, L.3 (testimony of Detective Karen Trent (Ret.) of the Buhl Police 
Department, who stated that she went to Buhl High School, spoke with H.O., and 
"declared" her to be in imminent danger placing her in the custody of Health and 
Welfare); Tr.2/1/11, p.78, L.10 - p.94, L.23 (testimony of Candice Ramsey, then Health 
and Welfare worker, who testified that she spoke with H.O. and Detective Trent, she 
took H.O. into custody, helped her gather some belongings from her home, and 
attended H.O.'s interview at the CARES center); Tr.2/2/11, p.141, L.11 - p.154, L.14 
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(testimony of Susan Hoag, CARES forensic interviewer, who testified that she 
conducted the forensic interview of H.O.); Tr.2/2/11, p.180, L.2 - p.228, L.15 (testimony 
of Patricia Billings, pediatric nurse practitioner, who testified that she conducted a 
physical examination of H.O. which did not reveal any signs of sexual abuse, although 
H.O. tested positive for the Human Papilloma Virus which indicates H.O. had engaged 
in sexual intercourse). 
The State next called Detective Becky White of the Twin Falls Police Department, 
who became the lead investigator in the case. (Tr.2/2/11, p.229, L.8 - p.232, L.9.) 
Detective White testified generally to what she did in her investigation including 
watching H.O.'s CARES interview and searching the Osterhoudt residence pursuant to 
a search warrant. (Tr.2/2/11, p.232, L.10 - p.270, L.1 O; Tr.2/3/11, p.294, L.19 - p.314, 
L.10, p.355, L.20 - p.390. L.16.) On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Osterhoudt 
asked Detective White, in reference to the allegations made on November 30, 2006, 
"And this is the first time that these allegations were disclosed to anyone, correct?" to 
which Detective Trent responded, "No, that's not true." (Tr.2/3/11, p.398, Ls.2-4.) 
Counsel for Mr. Osterhoudt then asked, "This was the first time to your understanding 
that these allegations had been disclosed; is that correct?" to which Detective White 
again responded, "No, that's not true." (Tr.2/3/11, p.398, Ls.5-7.) Over defense 
counsel's hearsay objection, the district court ruled that defense counsel opened the 
door through his cross-examination of Detective White that she could reveal that at age 
five, H.O. had alleged that Mr. Osterhoudt abused her. (Tr.2/4/11, p.461, L.20 - p.469, 
L.21, p.481, L.14 - p.482, L.23.) The district court specifically admonished the jury that 
they could not consider this allegation for the truth of the matters asserted but could 
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consider it only as to how it weighs on Detective White's credibility. (Tr.2/4/11, p.481, 
L.14-p.482, L.15.) 
Rylene Nowlin of the Idaho State Police Forensic Service Laboratory, testified that 
she tested the pajamas H.O. was wearing before and after the last alleged intercourse 
took place (see Tr.2/3/11, p.309, L.10 - p.310, L.19; Tr.2/3/11, p.423, Ls.8-22), and 
found that no body fluids were present (Tr.2/3/11, p.320, L.11 - p.331, L.15). The State 
further presented the testimony of Lisa Mitton who was allowed to present expert 
testimony regarding various aspects of child sexual abuse, although she did not 
personally review any materials pertaining to H.O.'s allegations. (Tr.2/4/11, p.508, L.22 
- p.559, L.12.) Ms. Mitton testified that "grooming," or "a planned behavior to initiate a 
relationship with the child with the intent of sexual contact," frequently occurs in child 
sexual abuse case, and involves paying special attention, providing treats, and 
providing positive emotional connections, in order to infringe on the child's boundaries. 
(Tr.2/4/11, p.538, L.13 - p.540, L.3.) She further testified that victims of abuse may 
become involved with drugs and alcohol; however, she did not specifically describe an 
abuser providing drugs and alcohol to the victim as a method of grooming. (Tr.2/4/11, 
p.508, L.22 - p.559, L.12.) 
H.O., now 19 (Tr.2/4/11, p.560, Ls.8-21 ), testified that for her 12th birthday she and 
her family, including her father, her brother F.O., her father's girlfriend Lisa Eklund, her 
cousins S.M. and K.M., her aunt Michelle Osterhoudt, and her grandmother Sharon 
Williams, went on a camping trip to Balanced Rock (Tr.2/8/11, p.608, L.17 - p.610, 
L.13). H.O. testified that at one point during the trip, her father took her into some 
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willows and had intercourse with her, stopping when he heard Y.S. and T.S. walking 
down the trail nearby. (Tr.2/8/11, p.614, L.19 - p.619, L.6.) 
H.O. further testified that the first time her father had intercourse with her was on 
the Fourth of July, 2002, when she was eleven years old, at her Aunt Shelly's house. 
(Tr.2/8/11, p.627, L.8 - p.629, L.2.) She testified that her father was living at Aunt 
Shelly's house at the time, and that she was visiting him. (Tr. 2/8/11, p.629, L.1 -
p.631, L.8.) H.O. testified that although she did not remember much, she remembered 
her father placing his penis in her vagina, stopping and apologizing saying that she was 
not ready yet. (Tr.2/8/11, p.631, L.24 - p.632, L.18.) She testified that she later woke 
up and discovered that she was bleeding, she woke her father up, and he directed her 
to her Aunt Shelly saying that she must have started her period. (Tr.2/8/11, p.632, L.22 
- p.633, L.3.) H.O. testified that she then woke up her Aunt Shelly who told her where 
she could find some pads, and she went and got one. (Tr.2/8/11, p.633, Ls.9-14.) She 
testified that she then went back into her father's room and crawled under the bed, he 
found her, laughed, and told her that he was sorry. (Tr.2/8/11, p.633, L.15 - p.634, 
L.17.) 
H.O. testified that on January 1, 2006, she asked her father if she could go to the 
movies with some friends - her father agreed but said she would have to have sex with 
him before she could go. (Tr.2/8/11, p.656, Ls.9-24.) She testified that she acquiesced 
and her father placed his penis inside of her vagina. (Tr.2/8/11, p.665, L.17 - p.666, 
L.12.) 
H.O. testified that there is a junkyard adjacent to their property owned by her 
uncle. (Tr.2/8/11, p.687, Ls.4-10.) She testified that in the summer of 2006, her father 
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took her to an abandoned van located in the junkyard that had a mattress in the back 
and he had sexual intercourse with her in the van. (Tr.2/8/11, p.689, L.4 - p.693, L.23.) 
H.O. testified that the last sexual act occurred at her father's house over Thanksgiving 
break in 2006, when he came into her room at 3:00 a.m. (Tr.2/8/11, p.712, Ls.1-25.) 
She testified that her father told her he wanted to have sex so she pulled down her 
pajama bottoms, he put his penis into her vagina, eventually ejaculating, and she pulled 
her pajamas back on when it ended. (Tr.2/8/11, p.713, L.8-p.714, L.10.) 
Although not tied to any specific event, H.O. testified that when she was younger 
she would try to fight or resist her father's actions, but he used the force of his weight to 
subdue her. (Tr.2/8/11, p.636, L.22 - p.638, L.24.) 
H.O. also testified, over an additional objection from Mr. Osterhoudt, that her 
father gave her methamphetamine for the first time on April 20, 2005, although this 
incident was not tied to any charged offense. (Tr.2/8/11, p.673, L.1 - p.674, L.19.) She 
further described two specific occasions in which Mr. Osterhoudt offered to give her 
methamphetamine in exchange for sex, on one occasion H.O. acquiesced (although it is 
not entirely clear whether she did so because of the offer of methamphetamine), and 
the other time she did not - neither of these alleged incidents were charged as specific 
counts. (Tr.2/8/11, p.675, L.7 - p.678, L.5.) The district court instructed the jurors that 
they could only consider this evidence "for the limited purpose proof or plan to commit a 
charged offense in this case." (Tr.2/8/11, p.678, Ls.12-20.) 
H.O. testified that she began dating Travis Pederson, who was eighteen or 
nineteen at the time, in May of 2006 when she was fourteen. (Tr.2/8/11, p.681, L.5 -
p.683, L.1, p.686, Ls.17-18.) She testified that her father found out Mr. Pederson's age 
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but he did not care. (Tr.2/8/11, p.683, L.22 - p.684, L.11.) H.O. alleged that 
Mr. Osterhoudt and Mr. Pederson got along so well that Mr. Osterhoudt got him a job 
where he worked. (Tr. 2/8/11, p.683, Ls.12-21.) In October of 2006, Mr. Pederson and 
his parents were arrested for possessing marijuana in their house. (Tr.2/8/11, p.694, 
Ls.7-13.) H.O. testified that her father then told her that she could not be seen in public 
with Mr. Pederson any more. (Tr.2/8/11, p.694, L.16 - p.695, L.2.) Although she was 
not supposed to, she would see Mr. Pederson when he would pick her up and take her 
from school during lunch breaks. (Tr.2/8/11, p.695, Ls.8-15.) H.O. claimed that 
Mr. Pederson and her father got into a fight at work and it became harder for H.O. to 
see Mr. Pederson because Mr. Osterhoudt did not want her to see him. (Tr.2/8/11, 
p.696, Ls.1-19.) At some point, Mr. Osterhoudt discovered that Mr. Pederson was 
picking H.O. up from school, even though she was not supposed to leave the school. 
(Tr.2/8/11, p.699, Ls.2-13.) 
H.O. testified that in November of 2006, she and her father again got into an 
argument about her seeing Mr. Pederson and he stopped her from leaving the property. 
(Tr.2/8/11, p.696, L.16 - p.701, L.5.) H.O. testified that she yelled at her father saying, 
"you're doing the same thing that Travis is doing." (Tr.2/8/11, p.707, L.24 - p.708, 
L.25.) She testified that when she returned to school after Thanksgiving break in 2006, 
she told Mr. Pederson, and then Mr. Pederson's mother, about the alleged abuse, and 
Mr. Pederson's mother told Mr. Gemar, the principal at Buhl High School. (Tr.2/8/11, 
p.717, L.3 - p.719, L.7.) H.O. stated that she didn't want to tell anyone and she didn't 
want her father to go to jail, but that she told Mr. Pederson because she, "just wanted 
someone to talk to. I just wanted somebody to listen to me. I wanted to feel like 
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somebody cared about me because I was all alone. I had nobody. And my dad 
wouldn't talk to me and my family hated me." (Tr.2/8/11, p.717, Ls.3-13.) 
On cross-examination, H.O. testified that she was in love with Mr. Pederson at 
the time she made her allegations and that she was using drugs and alcohol and having 
sex with him. (Tr.2/9/11, p.771, L.20 - p.773, L.25.) She testified that, at one point, 
Mr. Osterhoudt threatened to get a restraining order if she continued to see 
Mr. Pederson. (Tr.2/9/11, p.774, Ls.18-23.) She again testified that she told 
Mr. Pederson that her father was molesting her because she "needed somebody to talk 
to." (Tr.2/9/11, p.787, Ls.4-24.) During her CARES interview, she lied about the nature 
of her relationship with Mr. Pederson. (Tr.2/9/11, p.798, L.17 - p.799, L.12.) H.O. 
testified that she was furious that her father would not let her see Mr. Pederson 
anymore and she disobeyed that order. (Tr.2/9/11, p.873, L.9 - p.875, L.2.) 
Sharon Williams, Frank Osterhoudt's mother and H.O.'s grandmother 
(Tr.2/10/11, p.906, L.13 - p.908, L.3), testified that she told Detective White, while she 
was searching the residence, that H.0.'s allegations were stemming from her father 
forbidding her to see Mr. Pederson when he found out his age by reading a newspaper 
account of his arrest, but Detective White was not interested in what she had to say. 
(Tr.2/10/11, p.917, L.14 - p.929, L.4.) Ms. Williams also testified that she attempted to 
contact the elected prosecutor for Twin Falls County, the Sheriff of Twin Falls County 
and the Idaho Attorney General's Officer, to relay information that her son F.O. had 
relayed to her during a layover when he and H.O. were flying to New Zealand to live 
with their mother. (Tr.2/10/11, p.930, L.25 - p.937, L.13.) On cross-examination, 
Ms. Williams stated that she was not present when H.O. and Mr. Osterhoudt had their 
10 
argument, and was not present when any of the allegations of sexual activity took place. 
(Tr.2/10/11, p.957, L.5 - p.958, L.3.) When asked, "You have no testimony concerning 
the allegations of sex between Frank and [H.O.], do you?" she answered, "I just - I 
know what all took place, and I just - I know in my heart what started this." (Tr.2/10/11, 
p.958, Ls.4-7.) The State further cross-examined Ms. Williams on whether or not she 
had telephone conversations with her son regarding the substance of her testimony -
Ms. Williams agreed that she had conversations with Mr. Osterhoudt about the facts of 
the case but denied any type of coordinating with other witnesses about their testimony, 
and denied asking Mr. Osterhoudt during one conversation, "'Why weren't there any 
sheep in the lambing shed?'" and talking about calves being in the lambing shed. 
(Tr.2/10/11, p.959, L.9 - p.964, L.1; Tr.2/10/11, p.974, L.18 - p.983, L.9.) 
S.M., Mr. Osterhoudt's niece and H.O.'s cousin (Tr.2/10/11, p.984, L.22 - p.987, 
L.16), testified the room H.O. claimed that her father stayed in and allegedly had 
intercourse with her for the first time was actually her room, and that her uncle never 
stayed there (Tr.2/11/11, p.1011, L.11 -p.1014, L.24). Furthermore, S.M. testified that 
she had a full-sized bed with a box spring mattress laying directly on the floor, with no 
bed frame. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1015, L.12-p.1018, L.6.) In fact, the only bed in the house 
that had a frame belonged to her mother. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1016, Ls.6-16.) Thus, there 
was no way that H.O. could have hidden under the bed as she testified she had. 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1016, L.17 - p.1018, L.6.) Furthermore, S.M. testified that she was on 
the camping trip to Balanced Rock (although there was a dispute about what year the 
trip took place), and that she did not believe her uncle and H.O. were ever alone, and 
the area where they allegedly had intercourse was not secluded. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1020, 
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L.22 - p.1031, L.8.) S.M. testified that the night before H.O. told authorities that 
Mr. Osterhoudt had been molesting her, she observed H.O. and her father get into an 
argument about her seeing Mr. Pederson with H.O. yelling that she loved Mr. Pederson 
and would go into foster care if it meant being able to see him. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1090, L.7 
- p.1092, L.21.) 
Michelle (Shelly) Osterhoudt, Mr. Osterhoudt's sister and H.O.'s niece 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1104, L.19 - p.1106, L.1 ), testified that Mr. Osterhoudt never lived in her 
house in Buhl where H.O. claimed he had intercourse with her for the first time 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1117, L.15 - p.1119, L.23). Ms. Osterhoudt testified that the bed in 
S.M.'s room was on a box spring mattress laid directly on the floor, with no bed frame 
and no way to crawl under the bed. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1120, L.4 - p.1121, L.19.) 
Furthermore, she testified that H.O. did not come into her bedroom on the Fourth of 
July, 2002, and tell her that she started her period, and she would have remembered 
something like that happening. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1122, L.21 - p.1123, L.15.) 
Ms. Osterhoudt testified that H.O. and her father got into several arguments about her 
relationship with Mr. Pederson prior to her telling authorities that he molested her. 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1138, L.6-p.1142, L.14.) 
K.M., Mr. Osterhoudt's nephew and H.O.'s cousin (Tr.2/11/11, p.1144, L.2 -
p.1145, L.16), testified all of the kids' beds in the house in Buhl were on box springs 
directly on the floor and that there was no way that H.O. could have crawled under the 
bed as she had claimed (Tr.2/11/11, p.1149, L.21 -p.1154, L.7). K.M. testified that he 
was on the camping trip to Balanced Rock, that he did not ever see H.O. upset during 
the trip, and that he did not believe that H.O. was ever alone with her father, as all of the 
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kids liked to be around him and would have been upset if he would go off with just one 
of the kids at a time. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1155, L.11 - p.1161, L.14.) K.O. testified that he, 
his cousin F.O., and his uncle were all tagging sheep in the lambing shed on January 1, 
2006, beginning around 3:00 p.m. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1166, L.5 - p.1168, L.21.) At around 
8:30 or 9:00 that night, H.O. went down into the lambing shed to ask if she could go to 
the movies with her friends and, after initially saying no, Mr. Osterhoudt eventually gave 
in to H.O.'s pleas and gave her permission when her friends pulled up to the property. 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1172, L.3 - p.1173, L.25.) K.M. testified that the lambing shed itself was 
messy with animal waste and that he did not see H.O and Mr. Osterhoudt have sex. 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1174, L.1-p.1176, L.11.) 
Lisa Eklund, Mr. Osterhoudt's girlfriend during the period of time he was alleged 
to have molested H.O. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1196, L.14-p.1197, L.18), testified that during the 
camping trip to Balanced Rock, she and Mr. Osterhoudt rarely had time for themselves 
because all of the children wanted to be around him (Tr.2/15/11, p.1205, L.18 - p.1212, 
L.8). Ms. Eklund testified that H.O. was happy during the entire trip and that her 
demeanor never changed. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1215, Ls.3-15.) She also testified that the 
area where Mr. Osterhoudt supposedly had intercourse with his daughter was visible 
from the tent they were staying in and was full of stinging nettles. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1215, 
L.16 - p.1216, L.1.) Ms. Eklund testified that H.O. was generally a good student but 
then she started skipping school to be with Mr. Pederson who Ms. Eklund had believed 
was only sixten, but was in fact nineteen, at the time. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1220, L.15 -
p.1221, L.11.) Once she and Mr. Osterhoudt learned that Mr. Pederson was actually 
nineteen years-old, Mr. Osterhoudt told H.O. that she could not see Mr. Pederson 
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anymore. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1226, L.22 - p.1227, L.6.) H.O. began screaming and yelling 
at her father and she did not stop seeing him, skipping school to be with him. 
(Tr.2/15/11, p.1227, L.13 - p.1229, L.3.) Ms. Eklund witnessed an argument around 
Thanksgiving of 2006 where Mr. Osterhoudt threatened to take out a restraining order 
against Mr. Pederson, and H.O. screamed that she would tell Health and Welfare that 
Mr. Osterhoudt had been molesting her. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1229, L.4 - p.1233, L. 7.) 
F.O., Mr. Osterhoudt's son and H.O.'s older brother (Tr.2/15/11, p.1267, L.18 -
p.1268, L.18), testified that he too was on the camping trip to Balanced Rock, and that it 
would have been impossible for his father to have had intercourse with H.O., both due 
to the fact that none of the children went off alone with Mr. Osterhoudt, and the fact that 
the area where they supposedly had intercourse was full of stinging nettles (Tr.2/15/11, 
p.1276, L.3-p.1282, L.5). F.O. testified that he was tagging sheep in the lambing shed 
with his father and his cousin, K.M., on January 1, 2006, around 7:00 p.m., when H.O. 
came down to the shed and asked her father if she could go to a movie with friends -
her father initially said no but he eventually gave in when H.O. kept pleading with him to 
let her go. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1284, L.8 - p.1292, L.7.) He testified that he could hear what 
was happening, and H.O. and her father did not walk around the corner to have 
intercourse, and that had they done so, she would have gotten dirty due to the state of 
the lambing shed. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1292, L.8 - p.1294, L.17.) K.O. testified that at one 
point, he and H.O. were not getting along with Ms. Eklund and H.O. told him that they 
could get rid of her if he just told Health and Welfare that Ms. Eklund and touched him 
inappropriately, but he refused. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1296, L.10 - p.1298, L.21.) He also 
observed an argument between Mr. Osterhoudt and H.O. about H.O. seeing 
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Mr. Pederson where H.O. threatened to tell Health and Welfare that Mr. Osterhoudt was 
molesting her. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1298, L.22 p.1302, L.23.) F.O. further testified that H.O. 
told him once when they were travelling to New Zealand, and again when they were 
living in New Zealand with their mother, that H.O. made up the allegations; F.O. told 
some relatives and eventually tried to tell Detective White this information. (Tr.2/15/11, 
p.1307, L.16-p.1320, L.21.) 
Ms. Williams, S.M., Shelly Osterhoudt, K.M., Lisa Eklund, F.O, and Travis 
Pederson, all testified that, in their opinion, H.O. is not a truthful person. (Tr.2/10/11, 
p.969, Ls.18-25 (Sharon Williams); Tr.2/11/11, p.1092, L.22 - p.1093, L.11 (S.M.); 
Tr.2/11/11, p.1124, Ls.5-16 (Michelle Osterhoudt); Tr.2/11/11, p.1176, Ls.12-23 (K.M.); 
Tr.2/15/11, p.1233, L.8 - p.1234, L.4 (Lisa Eklund); Tr.2/16/11, p.1340, Ls.1-14 (F.O.) 
Tr.2/16/11, p.1397, Ls.14-24 (Travis Pederson).) 
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present testimony 
from H.O. that she had made a similar allegation against her father when she was five 
years old, as evidence purportedly rebutting the defense theory that H.O. made up the 
allegations in order to be with Mr. Pederson. (Tr.2/16/11, p.1400, L.8 - p.1425, L.15; 
Tr.2/16/11, p.1472, L.23 - p.1475, L.23.) The next day, the district court gave the jury 
an instruction that told them they could not consider the evidence to prove the 
defendant's character but rather, "[s]uch evidence may be considered by you only for 
the limited purpose of proof of a motivation to disclose and those issues concerning the 
witness' credibility and disclosure." (Tr.2/17/11, p.1496, L.22 - p.1497, L.7.) 
Furthermore, over defense counsel's hearsay objection, the district court allowed the 
State to present, as substantive evidence, nine, short audio recordings, one of a 
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conversation between Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, S.M., and the other eight 
conversations between Mr. Osterhoudt and his mother, Sharon Williams. (Tr.2/16/11, 
p.1456, L.15-p.1471, L.4; Tr.2/17/11, p.1482, L.6-p.1510, L.19.) 
The jury found Mr. Osterhoudt guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen (Count I - Father's house; Count V - Lambing Shed), incest, and forcible 
rape, and found Mr. Osterhoudt not guilty of three other counts of lewd conduct (Count 
Ill - Balanced Rock; Count IV - Aunt Shelly's house; Count VI - Junkyard). 
(R., pp.843-845.) The district court sentenced Mr. Osterhoudt to a unified term of life, 
with twenty-five years fixed, for each of the lewd conduct and the rape conviction, and a 
twenty-five year fixed-term for the incest conviction with each count to run concurrently 
for a total unified sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed. (R., pp.925-938; 
Tr.9/9/11, p.92, Ls.5-13.) 
Mr. Osterhoudt filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R., pp.956-959), and he asserted 
that the district court erred when it allowed H.O. to testify that Mr. Osterhoudt provided 
her with methamphetamine. Relying upon its own precedent in State v. Blackstead, 126 
Idaho 14 (Ct. App. 1994, and State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court 
of Appeals held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence that 
Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. with methamphetamine, even though the two acts 
occurred more than a year prior to the time period in which Count I was alleged to 
occurred, finding, "his previous pattern of providing H.O. with the addictive drug was 
relevant to show he was cultivating a controlling relationship over H.O., allowing him to 
sexually abuse her in November 2006." (Opinion, pp.5-7) The Court further found that, 
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because the district court provided the jury with a limiting instruction, the probative value 
of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. (Opinion, p.7.) 
Mr. Osterhoudt further asserted that the district court erred when it allowed the 
State to present evidence that at age five H.O. claimed that Mr. Osterhoudt sexually 
abused her, purportedly in rebuttal to Mr. Osterhoudt's defense that H.O. was making 
up the allegations in order to be with her boyfriend. Mr. Osterhoudt asserted that, 
because H.O.'s allegation at age five did not actually rebut the defense assertion that 
she was making up the allegations Mr. Osterhoudt was actually defending against in 
order to be with Mr. Pedersen, the district court erred in allowing the highly prejudicial 
prior bad acts evidence to be presented. A majority of the Court of Appeals, however, 
simply agreed with the district court. (Opinion. pp.8-9.) Judge Lansing wrote separately 
disagreeing with the majority's logic fining that, "The majority opinion holds, in 
substance, that H.O.'s testimony about the prior disclosure somehow corroborates her 
testimony about the subsequent abuse, but in my view that idea is without support and 
logic." (Opinion, p. 13-14 (J.Lansing concurring in the result).) Both the majority and 
Judge Lansing further supported their opinions by noting that Detective White had 
previously testified that H.O. made the disclosure at age five. (Opinion, pp.8-9, pp.13-
14 (J.Lansing, concurring in the result).) However, both the majority and Judge Lansing 
failed to recognize that Detective White's testimony was not admitted for the truth of the 
matter asserted, and the jury was specifically instructed that they could only consider 
the evidence as it weighed in their determination of Detective White's credibility. 
(Tr.2/4/11, p.481, L.14 - p.482, L.15.). 
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Mr. Osterhoudt additionally asserted that the district court erred in admitting 
recordings of phone conversations that he had with his mother and his niece for the 
truth of the matter asserted, rather than for the limited, non-hearsay purpose of 
impeaching his mother and niece. The Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Osterhoudt 
that the recordings were admissible only for non-hearsay purposes; however, the Court 
apparently held that the district court did, in fact, admit the evidence for purposes other 
than the truth of the matter asserted, and that Mr. Osterhoudt simply failed to ask for a 
limiting instruction. (Opinion, pp.10-12) Having found no errors in the district court's 
rulings, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Osterhoudt's cumulative error argument as 
well. (Opinion, p.12.) Mr. Osterhoudt filed a timely Petition for Review. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court grant Mr. Osterhoudt's Petition for Review and ultimately vacate his 
conviction? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant Mr. Osterhoudt's Petition For Review And Ultimately Vacate 
His Conviction 
A Introduction 
Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the district court erred in allowing H.O. to testify that 
Mr. Osterhoudt provided her with methamphetamine and that when she was five years 
old, he committed an act of oral to genital contact on her. He further asserts that the 
district court erred in allowing the State to present the recordings of conversations 
between he and his niece and he and his mother, as substantive evidence, rather than 
for the limited, non-hearsay purpose of evaluating the credibility of witnesses. He 
asserts that the Court of Appeals' decisions affirming the district court's ruling are in part 
inconsistent with prior precedent from this Court and are in part based upon a 
misunderstanding of the record in this case; therefore, Mr. Osterhoudt asks this Court to 
grant his Petition for Review. Furthermore, because the State failed to argue on appeal 
that any of the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court must vacate 
Mr. Osterhoudt's convictions. 
8. Standards Governing Petitions For Review 
The decision on whether to grant a Petition for Review is left to the sound 
discretion of the Idaho Supreme Court and will be granted only when there are special 
and important reasons for doing so. I.AR. 118(b). The criteria for granting a Petition 
for Review include whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with prior 
precedent. I.AR. 118(b)(2)-(3). When the Supreme Court grants a Petition for Review, 
it directly reviews the trial court's decisions. State v. Pepcom, 152 Idaho 678, 686 
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(2012). For the reasons stated below, this Court should grant Mr. Osterhoudt's Petition 
for Review and ultimately vacate his conviction. 
C. This Court Should Grant Mr. Osterhoudt's Petition For Review And Ultimately 
Hold That The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence, 
Pursuant To IRE 404(B), That Mr. Osterhoudt Provided Methamphetamine To 
H.O., As Such Evidence Was Not Relevant To Any Charged Count 
1. Introduction 
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present evidence 
that Mr. Osterhoudt was "grooming" H.O. by providing her methamphetamine, beginning 
when she was fourteen years old. The district court ruled that such evidence was 
admissible only as it related to Count I, which alleged an act of lewd conduct committed 
on or between November 1, 2006, and November 30, 2006. As H.O. herself testified, 
she had stopped using methamphetamine by October of 2006. Therefore, because 
Mr. Osterhoudt's alleged supplying H.O. with meth is not tied to any charged crime, 
such evidence was not relevant. As such, the district court erred in finding that the 
evidence was relevant and abused its discretion by admitting this evidence. 
Furthermore, the State will be unable to prove that the admission of this evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Evidence Of Other Wrongs Committed By The Defendant Are Generally 
Not Admissible Against The Defendant 
It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal system that a defendant may only 
be convicted based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged 
and not based upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1994). Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an 
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unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: 
(1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or 
(2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the 
charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. Id. at 
244-45. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to 
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a 
man of criminal character." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 
Idaho 506, 510 (1978)). Therefore, I.RE. 404 precludes the use of character evidence 
or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted consistently 
with those past acts or traits. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404 provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of 
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
IRE 404. "Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a 
permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. "First, the 
trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other 
crime or wrong as fact." Id. (citations omitted). "The trial court must then determine 
whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material and disputed issue 
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). This evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Id. (citation omitted). The question of 
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whether or not proffered evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. 
Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202 (2006). 
Next, the trial court must engage in a balancing analysis pursuant to IRE 403 and 
must determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (citation omitted). This 
balancing is committed to the discretion of the court. Id. (citing Field, 144 Idaho at 569). 
In reviewing the district court's discretionary decisions, a reviewing Court must examine 
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial 
court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; 
and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. at 51 (citing 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (in turn, 
citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). 
3. Evidence That Mr. Osterhoudt Provided H.O. With Methamphetamine 
Was Not Related To The Crimes Charged And, Therefore, Such Evidence 
Was Not Relevant To Any Material And Disputed Issue 
The district court ruled that the State provided "sufficient foundational evidence 
that a reasonable jury could believe" that on two specific occasions, Mr. Osterhoudt 
offered H.O. methamphetamine in exchange for sex, but no sexual activity actually 
occurred, and that Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. with methamphetamine on a regular 
basis after July 4, 2006, until she went into foster care on November 30, 2006. 
(R., pp.294-297.) The district court's factual determination is, in part, in error. H.O. 
testified during the pre-trial hearing that the last time Mr. Osterhoudt offered her 
methamphetamine was in November of 2006, but that the last time she used 
methamphetamine with her father was in September of 2006. (Tr.6/11/10, p.944, L.14 -
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p.960, L.24.) The district court ruled that the evidence Mr. Osterhoudt attempted to 
bribe H.O. with methamphetamine in exchange for sex was relevant as it related to 
Count I, as "such evidence is probative of a continuing criminal design by the defendant 
to cultivate a relationship with [H.0.] to induce her submission to his sexual demands, 
i.e., grooming." (R., pp.294-299.) 
The district court based its decision on the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. B/ackstead, 126 Idaho 14 (Ct. App. 1994). (R., pp.294-299.) In Blackstead, the 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant's drug use with the alleged victim and asking 
her to '"slip away'" during an incident occurring after he had provided the victim with 
drugs and had sexual intercourse with her, "was probative of a continuing criminal 
design by Blackstead to cultivate a relationship with R.S., induce her submission to his 
sexual demands and procure her silence through use of drugs - a process which the 
district court referred to as 'grooming."' Id. at 19-20. The B/ackstead Court's finding 
that other wrongs may be admissible if they support a finding of "continuing criminal 
design," relied upon by the district court in the present case, is questionable in light of 
the Grist Court's reiteration of the fact that IRE 404(b) is designed to keep out evidence 
that a defendant is a person of bad character, which "induces the jury to believe the 
accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of 
criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 
(1978)). Nevertheless, assuming but not conceding that Blackstead is still good law, the 
district court's admission of evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt provided methamphetamine to 
H.O. and offered her methamphetamine in exchange for sex, was in error in this case, 
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as the evidence was not relevant to the crime charged in Count I, the only charge that 
the district court found the evidence was relevant to. 
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Court of Appeals relied upon both 
Blackstead, and its later opinion in State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714 (Ct. App. 2012), for 
the proposition that "grooming" evidence is admissible because it is an application of, 
and not an "exception" to, I.RE. 404(b). (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The Court of Appeals found 
that "similar to our determination in Truman, Osterhoudt's act of repeatedly offering H.O. 
methamphetamine demonstrates his continuing criminal design to achieve submission 
to his sexual demands." (Opinion, p.6 (citing Truman, 150 Idaho at 722.)) 
However, both the district court and the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that 
that the Grist opinion rejects the very rationale used to justify the admission of the 
evidence in this case. Regardless of what label the Court uses to justify its admission, 
"[t]he trial court must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a 
material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) Labeling evidence as 
"grooming" or finding that it is part of a "continuing criminal design" to commit some 
criminal act at some point in the future, does not alleviate the general bar on admitting 
evidence of the defendant's poor character, or the specific requirement that such 
evidence is only admissible if it can be tied to the specific crimes charged. As such, the 
Court of Appeals opinion in this case is inconsistent with this Court's precedent as 
stated in State v. Grist. 
In the present case, H.O. testified over an additional objection from Mr. Osterhoudt 
that her father gave her methamphetamine for the first time on April 20, 2005. 
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(Tr.2/8/11, p.673, L.1 - p.67 4, L.19.) She further described two specific occasions in 
which Mr. Osterhoudt offered to give her methamphetamine in exchange for sex, on one 
occasion H.O. acquiesced (although it is not entirely clear whether she did so because 
of the offer of methamphetamine), and the other time she did not - but neither of these 
alleged incidents were charged as specific counts, and both of these incidents occurred 
in the summer of 2005. (Tr.2/8/11, p.675, L. 7 - p.678, L.11.) Unlike the pre-trial 
hearing, at trial H.O. failed to testify that her father continued to offer her 
methamphetamine after July 4, 2005. Id. In fact, H.O. testified at trial that she stopped 
using methamphetamine completely by October of 2006. (Tr.2/8/11, p.686, Ls.4-9.) As 
Count I alleged that the lewd conduct occurred sometime between November 1, 2006, 
and November 30, 2006 (R., p.125), the State failed to tie this alleged 404(b) evidence 
to any specific count. Because proffered evidence of other wrongs is only admissible 
pursuant to 404(b) if it can be tied to one of the counts charged, rather than just 
demonstrate the bad character of the defendant (see Grist, 147 Idaho at 52), the district 
court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that the evidence was relevant. 
4. Even If In Its De Novo Review This Court Determines That Evidence 
Mr. Osterhoudt Provided H.O. With Methamphetamine Was Relevant, 
This Court Should Find That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting This Evidence As The Probative Value Of The Evidence Was 
Substantially Outweighed By Its Prejudicial Effect 
To the extent the evidence Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. with methamphetamine 
is relevant at all, its relevance is minimal. Without tying the alleged methamphetamine 
use to the act alleged in Count I (Mr. Osterhoudt allegedly going into H.O.'s bedroom at 
3:00 a.m. and having intercourse with her, with no offer or use of meth mentioned (see 
Tr.2/8/11, p.712, L.1 - p.714, L.10)), evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt had previously 
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provided H.0. with methamphetamine and on two occasions, about a year and one-half 
earlier, and had offered her methamphetamine in exchange for sex, was highly 
prejudicial. Rather than having to determine whether the State proved Count I based 
solely on H.O.'s allegation, in light of Lisa Eklund's testimony that she usually woke up if 
Mr. Osterhoudt got out of bed (Tr.2/15/11, p.1260, Ls.4-12), and in light of the fact that 
the pajamas did not contain any bodily fluids (Tr.2/3/11, p.320, L.11 - p.331, L.15), the 
jury was allowed to consider the fact that Mr. Osterhoudt was a person of ill character 
who had previously provided his daughter with methamphetamine. The district court's 
limiting instruction, not withstanding (see Opinion, p.7), such evidence is highly 
prejudicial and this Court should find that the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing such evidence to be presented to the jury. 
5. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Erroneous Admission Of 
This Evidence Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant 
shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). Mr. Osterhoudt objected to the admission of evidence that 
he provided and offered H.O. methamphetamine (R., pp.27-272, 708-709) and, as 
argued above, the district court erred in admitting this evidence. The State failed to 
either assert or demonstrate in its Respondent's Brief that any error in this case was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Respondent's Brief. As such, if 
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this Court finds error, it must vacate Mr. Osterhoudt's convictions. See State v. 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-599 (2013). 
Should this Court consider a harmless error argument made for the first time on 
review, in light of the evidence presented contradicting H.O.'s claims, and in light of the 
fact that the jury acquitted Mr. Osterhoudt of three of the seven charges it considered, 
the State will be unable to prove that the error in admitting this evidence was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Shelly Osterhoudt, S.M. and K.M. all testified that the beds 
in their former house in Buhl (Aunt Shelly's house) where Mr. Osterhoudt allegedly had 
intercourse with H.O. were on box springs; therefore, H.O. could not have hidden under 
the bed after the alleged intercourse took place. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1011, L.11 - p.1017, 
L.5; Tr.2/11/11, p.1120, L.4 - p.1121, L.19; Tr.2/11/11, p.1149, L.21 - p.1154, L.7.) 
Shelly Osterhoudt further testified that H.O. did not come into her bedroom on the 
Fourth of July, 2002, to tell her that she started her period, and she would have 
remembered something like that happening. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1122, L.21 - p.1123, L.15.) 
S.M., K.M., Lisa Eklund, and F.O. all testified that they were on the camping trip with 
H.O. and they did not see H.O. go off alone with Mr. Osterhoudt at any time. 
(Tr.2/11/11, p.1020, L.22 - p.1031, L.8; Tr.2/11/11, p.1155, L.11 - p.1161, L.14; 
Tr.2/15/11, p.1205, L.18 - p.1212, L.8; Tr.2/15/11, p.1276, L.3 - p.1282, L.5.) 
Furthermore, Ms. Eklund testified that H.O. was happy on the trip and her demeanor 
never changed, and both she and F.O testified that the area where the intercourse 
allegedly took place was full of stinging nettles. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1215, L.3 - p.1216, L.1; 
Tr.2/15/11, p.1276, L.3 - p.1282, L.5.) 
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Furthermore, both K.M. and F.O. testified that they were present tagging sheep 
in the lambing shed on January 1, 2006, where H.O. alleged that her father made her 
have intercourse with him before she could do to the movie both testified that H.O. 
convinced Mr. Osterhoudt to let her go to the movie after he initially said no, they both 
would have known if any sexual contact took place, and both indicated that no sexual 
contact occurred. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1166, L.5 - p.1176, L.11; Tr.2/15/11, p.1284, L.12 -
p.1294, L.17.) Lisa Eklund testified that when Mr. Osterhoudt would get out of bed, she 
would usually wake up although she indicated that she would not know what 
Mr. Osterhoudt was doing if he did get out of bed at 3:00 on the night of the last alleged 
incident of intercourse. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1260, Ls.4-12) Furthermore, Rylene Nowlin of the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Service Laboratory, testified that she tested the pajamas 
H.O. was wearing before and after the last alleged intercourse took place (see 
Tr.2/3/11, p.309, L.10 - p.310, L.19; Tr.2/3/11, p.423, Ls.8-22), and found that no body 
fluids were present (Tr.2/3/11, p.320, L.11 - p.331, L.15). 
S.M., Shelly Osterhoudt, Lisa Eklund, and F.O. all testified that they witnessed 
H.O. and her father get into arguments about him forbidding her from seeing 
Mr. Pederson anymore, including H.O. threatening to tell Health and Welfare that 
Mr. Osterhoudt was molesting her if he did not let her see him. (Tr.2/11/11, p.1090, L.7 
- p.1092, L.21; Tr.2/11/11, p.1138, L.6 - p.1142, L.14; Tr.2/15/11, p.1226, L.22 -
p.1233, L.7; Tr.2/15/11, p.1298, L.22 - p.1302, L.32.) H.O. herself testified that she 
was furious that her father would not let her see Mr. Pederson anymore and that she 
disobeyed that order. (Tr.2/9/11, p.873, L.9 - p.875, L.2.) 
29 
F.O. testified that H.O. once suggested that he tell Health and Welfare that Lisa 
Eklund was inappropriately touching him, and further testified that H.O. admitted to him 
that she had made up the allegations. (Tr.2/15/11, p.1296, L.10 - p.1298, L.21; 
Tr.2/15/11, p.1307, L.16 - p.1320, L.21.) Ms. Williams, S.M., Shelly Osterhoudt, K.M., 
Lisa Eklund, F.O, and Travis Pederson, all testified that, in their opinion, H.O. is not a 
truthful person. (Tr.2/10/11, p.969, Ls.18-25 (Sharon Williams); Tr.2/11/11, p.1092, 
L.22 - p.1093, L.11 (S.M.); Tr.2/11/11, p.1124, Ls.5-16 (Michelle Osterhoudt); 
Tr.2/11/11, p.1176, Ls.12-23 (K.M.); Tr.2/15/11, p.1233, L.8-p.1234, L.4 (Lisa Eklund); 
Tr.2/16/11, p.1340, Ls.1-14 (F.O.) Tr.2/16/11, p.1397, Ls.14-24 (Travis Pederson).) 
Based upon the above evidence tending to, at the very least, create a reasonable 
doubt as to the veracity of H.O.'s allegations, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the State will 
be unable to demonstrate the error in allowing the jury to hear evidence that 
Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. methamphetamine was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. As such, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that this Court must vacate his convictions. 
D. This Court Should Grant Review And Ultimately Find That The District Court 
Erred In Allowing The State To Present Evidence, In Rebuttal And Pursuant To 
IRE 404(b), That Ms. Osterhoudt Molested H.O. When She Was Five Years Old, 
As Such Evidence Did Not Rebut Any Arguments Or Claims Made By The 
Defense And Was Highly Prejudicial 
1. Introduction 
Over defense objection, the district allowed H.O. to testify that she first claimed 
that Mr. Osterhoudt had sexually abused her when she was five years old, purportedly 
in rebuttal to the claim that she accused Mr. Osterhoudt of the crimes he was actually 
charged with so that she could be with Mr. Pederson. However, this evidence did not 
30 
actually rebut any evidence presented by the defense, and was pure propensity 
evidence. As such, the district court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence. 
Furthermore, the State will be unable to prove that the admission of this evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. The District Court Erred In Determining That The Allegation H.O. Made 
When She Was Five Was Relevant To Rebut A Claim That She Made The 
Later Allegations In Order To Be With Mr. Pederson 
The proper standards used in reviewing a district court's admission of evidence 
pursuant to IRE 404(b) are articulated in section C(2) of this Brief above and will not be 
repeated in detail but are incorporated herein by reference. 
The district court ruled as follows: 
Well, the reason or motivation behind the disclosure in 2006 has 
been the focus of extensive testimony in the trial from a variety of 
witnesses. And some of that's gone both ways, including from the last 
witness called, who, frankly, went against some of the other witnesses, 
saying she may have only reported it to get it off of her chest. 
There was conflicting evidence, to be sure, but there was extensive 
testimony about the motivation to go to the school and disclose at the time 
in November. And so there's an obvious factual issue that's the heart of 
the trial. Whether was that was done for some improper purpose of 
getting back at her father or mad about being grounded or mad about not 
being able to see Travis Pederson or whether this really happened, it's the 
obvious issue of the case. And there was extensive defense testimony 
put on that. 
It is 404(b) evidence, but it's evidence of another crime or act, and 
that's not admissible for certain purposes. There are purposes it can be 
offered for in terms of [H.O.'s] motive to disclose, so 404(b) is not -- has 
many suggested purposes. It's not exclusive. And I'm aware of the Grist 
case, saying you can't just bolster a witness or assert corroboration or 
somehow somebody can testify about all kinds of incidents just to bolster 
their own testimony, but here it seems, based on the proffer, that it goes to 
a narrower purpose than that. 
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And I don't see any details here of the prior abuse. It goes to 
disclosure and it says touching. Obviously there is an indication that it 
was improper touching. 
In the context of the trial its purpose is even clearer: There are 
more detailed or inflammatory alleged acts discussed throughout the trial. 
And it's highly relevant evidence because entirety -- or not entirety -- but 
extensive testimony went to [H.O.'s] motivation to disclose as she did at 
the school. And it's notable that the proffer is that when she was young 
she told somebody at the school about it, so there are similarities in that 
regard. And there does not appear to be the presence of other improper 
motive. So it's highly relevant to rebut the implication that the defense has 
gone to extensive trouble and presented extensive testimony on to set 
forth that the only reason she was disclosing was for Travis and she had 
an improper motive in somehow disclosing. And this evidence directly 
rebuts that. 
(Tr.2/16/11, p.1420, L.1 - p.1421, L.21.) The Court of Appeals simply acquiesced to the 
district court's analysis finding that because the prior disclosure occurred prior to H.O. 
meeting Mr. Pederson, the prior disclosure "directly rebuts" the defense allegation that 
H.O. made up the current allegations to be with Mr. Pederson. (Opinion, pp.8-9) 
H.O. testified that her father had molested her when she was five and that she 
contemporaneously told authorities of this abuse. (Tr.2/16/11, p.1472, L.23 - p.1475, 
L.23.) The next day, the district court gave the jurors an instruction that told them they 
could not consider the evidence to prove the defendant's character but rather, "[s]uch 
evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of proof of a motivation 
to disclose and those issues concerning the witness' credibility and disclosure." 
(Tr.2/17/11, p.1496, L.22 - p.1497, L.7.) 
The district court's ruling that the evidence was relevant to rebut evidence 
proffered by the defense is logically challenged and factually erroneous. "Rebuttal 
evidence is evidence which explains, repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence which 
has been introduced by or on behalf of an adverse party." State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 
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278, 281 (1982). Logically, the fact that H.O. made an allegation when she was five, an 
allegation that was never charged and never proven, does not explain, repel, 
counteract, or disprove a claim that she made up the allegations charged in the present 
case in order to be with Mr. Pederson. Had H.O. testified that she made the allegations 
that were actually charged prior to meeting Mr. Pedersen, or had she testified that she 
really didn't want to be with Mr. Pederson, the State would have presented evidence to 
rebut the claim that she made up the allegations in order to be with Mr. Pederson. 
Simply put, H.O.'s allegation at age five has nothing to do with whether or not she made 
up allegations against her father at age fifteen in order to be with Mr. Pederson. Her 
allegation at age five has nothing to do at all with her motivation to accuse at age 
fifteen. 
Furthermore, the district court's ruling is factually erroneous. H.O. did not testify 
that her motivation to disclose allegations at age fifteen had anything to do with the fact 
that she made an allegation when she was five. Such evidence, if actually presented, 
could reasonably be called rebuttal evidence. However, H.O. testified the reason she 
disclosed was that, "I just wanted someone to talk to. I just wanted somebody to listen 
to me. I wanted to feel like somebody cared about me because I was all alone. I had 
nobody. And my dad wouldn't talk to me and my family hated me." (Tr.2/8/11, p. 717, 
Ls.3-13.) Her testimony that she made the disclosure because she wanted to have 
someone to talk to, certainly rebuts the claim that she made up the allegations in order 
to be with Mr. Pederson, and the jury could decide which of these two explanations to 
believe. The opposite is equally true - evidence presented by the defense that 
suggested H.O. made up the allegations in order to be with Mr. Pederson is rebuttal 
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evidence of H.O.'s testimony that she disclosed due to feelings of loneliness, etc. Both 
logically and factually, H.O.'s allegation at age five has nothing to do with her motivation 
to accuse at age fifteen. The district court's determination that the evidence was 
relevant is in error. 
3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining That The 
Relevance Of The Fact That H.O. Alleged Her Father Had Molested Her 
When She Was Five Was Not Outweighed By Its Prejudicial Effect 
Even assuming there was some relevance to the fact that, when she was five 
years-old, H.O. had alleged Mr. Osterhoudt abused her, any relevance was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court weighed 
the probative value versus the prejudicial impact and concluded as follows: 
The court still has to, if relevant, do the 403 analysis. So I would 
rule that it is relevant and the door's been opened extensively to her 
motivation for disclosure. And there's the implication of recent fabrication. 
I'm aware of the difference in the hearsay rule versus the 404 rule, but -
So then the question is, if relevant, the evidence can be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Here the evidence 
is highly relevant. It has substantial probative value. There is a danger of 
unfair prejudice, but I'd note that that's lessened by a couple of things. 
One, it appears based on the transcript I've read by way of proffer 
that it's a fairly discreet and isolated incident. It has already been 
mentioned fairly because the door was already directly opened by 
other witnesses. So to the extent it's got some improper purpose, 
it's already out there and it explains quite of bit of what's going on at 
the trial. 
So there is not an undue danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of 
the issues. It will clarify the issues. And what is -- as I ruled before when 
the door was opened already to other -- to essentially something similar 
about the prior disclosure -- what is unfair is to try the case in a vacuum. 
And that is misleading to the jury. 
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And I'm aware the purpose of 404(b) has the effect of keeping 
highly relevant truthful information out because of the danger of unfair 
prejudice; but it's also problematic to allow an entire area that in this case 
can't be seen as a slip up or an accident or something, it's the entire gist 
of extensive testimony from multiple witnesses that there was some 
improper motive to disclose it at the time it was and then not to be able to 
somehow rebut that with testimony that things had been disclosed at prior 
times. So there's that. 
So there's a highly relevant purpose aside from mere propensity 
that doesn't go into the details too much about a particular incident that 
directly rebuts extensive testimony. 
But the topic of [H.O.'s] motivation and disclosure was the entirety 
of the defense. So in that light it is a proper purpose, there's not an undue 
risk of unfair prejudice. There is a risk of confusion of the issues if it's not 
admitted. So it's a little bit different in this case: That keeping it out will 
confuse the issues more than letting it in. 
And I've noted that at the time, so I would rule that in rebuttal the 
state may ask [H.O.] about the disclosure at age five, assuming it's along 
the lines of the transcript pages we've discussed. If there are anymore 
extensive details than that, we'd have to revisit the issue. 
(Tr.2/16/11, p.1421, L.22 - p.1424, L.3 (emphasis added).) 
Both the district court and the members of the Court of Appeals (Opinion, pp.8-9, 
pp.13-14 (J.Lansing, concurring in the result)), operated under the erroneous belief that 
the proffered evidence was already in evidence - it was not. Over defense counsel's 
hearsay objection, the district court ruled that defense counsel opened the door through 
his cross-examination of Detective White that she could reveal that at age five, H.O. had 
alleged that Mr. Osterhoudt abused her. (Tr.2/4/11, p.461, L.20 - p.469, L.21, p.481, 
L.14 - p.482, L.23.) The district court specifically admonished the jury that they could 
not consider this allegation for the truth of the matter asserted and could consider only 
as to how it weighs on Detective White's credibility. (Tr.2/4/11, p.481, L.14 - p.482, 
35 
L.15.) Therefore, prior to the district court allowing H.O. to testify that she made a 
disclosure at age five, such an allegation could not have been considered for the truth of 
the matter asserted, i.e., it could not have been considered as substantive evidence by 
the jury. The district court simply failed to adequately consider the prejudicial impact of 
the proffered evidence. 
Second, in reality, the evidence was pure propensity evidence. Evidence of prior 
bad acts may be admitted to corroborate a victim's testimony or as evidence of a 
common scheme or plan; however, "trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence 
offered as 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a 'common scheme or plan' in order to 
avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative of the defendant's 
propensity to engage in criminal behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. While prior bad acts 
evidence may be offered to corroborate a victim's testimony, "evidence offered for the 
purpose of 'corroboration' must actually serve that purpose; the courts of this state must 
not permit the introduction of impermissible propensity evidence merely by relabeling it 
as 'corroborative' or as evidence of a 'common scheme or plan."' Grist, 147 Idaho at 
53-54. "Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to IRE 
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate 
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Id. In order to demonstrate 
that the proposed evidence demonstrates a "common scheme or plan," the State must 
demonstrate such a plan "embrac[es] the commission of two or more crimes so related 
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other .... " Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-
(citations omitted.) 
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The evidence presented suggested to the jury that Mr. Osterhoudt had been 
sexually abusing H.O. for a much longer period than had been alleged in the charging 
document. This evidence was highly prejudicial and this prejudice substantially 
outweighed the minimal, if any, probative value the State asserted, i.e., H.O.'s purported 
reason for disclosure, which she actually disavowed through her own testimony. Thus, 
the district court abused its discretion by allowing H.O. to testify that she, at age five, 
made an allegation of abuse against her father. 
4. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Erroneous Admission Of 
This Evidence Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
As the State failed to assert and prove that any error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, this Court must vacate his convictions. (See generally Respondent's 
Brief; see also State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-599 (2013). If this Court considers 
a harmless error argument raised for the first time on review, for the reasons articulated 
in section C(5) of this Brief above, which are incorporated herein by reference, 
Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the State will be unable to prove that the evidence that H.O. 
accused her father, at age five, of molesting her, is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. As such, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that this Court must vacate his convictions. 
E. If This Court Grants Review. It Should Find That The District Court Erred In 
Admitting Recordings Of Phone Conversations Between Mr. Osterhoudt And His 
Niece. And Mr. Osterhoudt And His Mother, As Substantive Evidence For The 
Truth Of The Matter Asserted 
1. Introduction 
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present audio 
recordings of phone conversations that Mr. Osterhoudt had with his niece and his 
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mother, as substantive evidence. Assuming the evidence was admissible as either 
impeachment evidence or evidence of bias on the part of either S.M. or Sharon 
Williams, the proffered evidence was still hearsay and should not have been admitted 
for the truth of the matter asserted. By allowing the jury to consider these recordings as 
substantive evidence, rather than merely impeaching, the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. Furthermore, the State will be unable to prove the 
error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Standards Of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
564 (2007) (in turn citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112 (2005)). This Court must 
examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. 
(citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991) 
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the distinction between substantive 
evidence and impeachment evidence in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011 ), in 
which the Court stated, 
The Court of Appeals has aptly described the difference between 
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which 
the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is 
that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
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effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
Examples of impeachment evidence would include prior 
inconsistent statements, bias, attacks on [the] character of a 
witness, prior felony convictions, and attacks on the capacity 
of the witness to observe, recall or relate. Evidence may be both 
substantive and impeaching. 
Id. at 74 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 (Ct. App. 
2004) (in turn quoting Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35 (Ct. App. 1998)). The 
Ellington Court further stated, '"One recognized method of impeachment is by showing 
that on a prior occasion, the witness made a statement inconsistent with testimony he 
gave at trial."' Id. (quoting State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 688 (1976); l.R.E. 613(b).) 
Furthermore, "[i]n Idaho, a prior inconsistent statement can also be used as substantive 
evidence, so long as the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement, and the statement was given under oath at a prior 
proceeding." l.R.E. 801 (d)(1 ). 
3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The Audio 
Recordings To Be Considered As Substantive Evidence 
The defense objected to the admission of these audio recordings for multiple 
reasons, including based upon the fact that they contain hearsay. (Tr.2/16/11, p.1456, 
L.15 - p.1471, L.4.) The district court held that the audio recordings were admissible as 
"some of the statements in these are prior inconsistent statements, or could be viewed 
that way," and that, 
What these tape-recorded conversations show is a pattern of 
witnesses planning testimony, conferring about it. Concoct may be a 
strong word, but that is an inference that can properly be drawn from the 
recordings. Getting their stories together, at best. 
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Now there may be an alternate explanation for that, so the court in 
making this ruling does not need to find that fact exactly if the evidence 
has the tendency to show that, which is an obvious and reasonable 
inference from the context of these calls. 
So as to the relevance objection, some of the calls are brief, and 
perhaps if that were the only fragment would not appear to have much 
relevant information, but in light of the other phone calls they have obvious 
and extensive relevance. 
As to the question of impeachment, what we're dealing with here is 
not merely impeachment of a prior inconsistent statement. We're talking 
about bias, and I guess to put it uncharitably and maybe the most extreme 
inference again, fabrication or concocting of testimony. The witnesses 
testified to that. Their motive, their bias is all relevant. It is the most 
important issue in the trial. It is the most important function of the justice 
system, as the defense has argued when it came to the 404(b) evidence, 
to get at the truth. 
So bias is not collateral and bias is not something that is limited 
necessarily by the impeachment rule of prior inconsistent statements. And 
here by bias we have an effort where an inference can be drawn strongly 
from these recordings that there was an effort to coordinate testimony 
which was denied directly on the stand. 
(Tr.2/17/11, p.1493, L.4 - p.1495, L.13.) The jury was allowed to hear the contents of 
the audio recording with no instruction limiting what they could be considered for, 
indicating that the district court admitted the audios as substantive evidence, rather than 
merely impeaching evidence or evidence of alleged bias. (R., pp.816-842; Tr.2/17 /11, 
p.1482, L.6 - p.1508, L.4.) 
There is no question that the statements in the conversations made either by S.M. 
or by Sharon Williams are hearsay - that is, they were statements "other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted." IRE 801 (c). S.M. and Ms. Williams were not under oath 
when they made the statements. See IRE 801(d)(1). On the other hand, the 
statements made by Mr. Osterhoudt in the same conversations would not be considered 
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hearsay. See IRE 801 (d)(2). Thus, if they are admissible at all, the statements made 
by S.M. and Ms. Williams were not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 74. 
The district court, however, even when recognizing that the statements could be 
admissible for impeachment purposes or to show bias on the part of the witness, failed 
to recognize that the jury could not consider the evidence for the truth of the matter 
asserted. As noted above, the court found that bias was not collateral and not limited 
by the impeachment rule of prior inconsistent statements. (Tr.2/17 /11, p.1493, L.4 -
p.1495, L.13.) While the district court's distinction between evidence that is 
"impeaching" and evidence that shows "bias" may be a simple matter of semantics, a 
distinction the Ellington Court found the Court of Appeal correctly recognized as 
unavailing (see Ellington at 74), the statements made by S.M. and Ms. Williams were 
made out of court, and not under oath, and, therefore, were inadmissible to show the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
The district court abused its discretion by admitting these statements as 
substantive evidence, i.e., as truth of the matter asserted. 
4. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Erroneous Admission Of 
This Evidence Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
As the State failed to assert and prove that any error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, this Court must vacate his convictions. (See generally Respondent's 
Brief; see also State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-599 (2013). If this Court considers 
a harmless error argument raised for the first time on review, for the reasons articulated 
in section C(5) of this Brief above, which are incorporated herein by reference, 
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Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the State will be unable to prove that the evidence that H.O. 
accused her father, at age five, of molesting her, is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. As such, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that this Court must vacate his convictions. 
Furthermore, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts there are additional reasons why the State 
will be unable to demonstrate the admission of these audio recordings are harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. During the conversations, first S.M. and Mr. Osterhoudt, 
then Ms. Williams and Mr. Osterhoudt, discussed letters that had been sent and 
whether other individuals had read them, but the content of the letters was never 
revealed, and the letters themselves were not admitted into evidence. (See generally, 
Exhs. 66-74.) Notably, Ms. Williams and Mr. Osterhoudt discussed whether or not there 
were sheep or calves in the lambing shed on January 1, 2006. (See Exhs.70, 71, 73.) 
The issue of whether or not K.M., F.O., and Mr. Osterhoudt were tagging sheep on 
January 1, 2006, was highly relevant for the jury's consideration as, if they found that 
the three were tagging sheep on that day, it is much less likely that they would have 
believed H.O.'s claim that she went into the lambing shed and had intercourse with 
Mr. Osterhoudt within earshot, if not eyesight, of K.M. and F.O., with sheep feces on the 
floor, and then immediately went to the movies with her friend. However, if the jury 
believed they were not tagging sheep at the time, H.O.'s story may have had more 
validity. The jury convicted Mr. Osterhoudt of this charge. (R., p.844.) 
In short, the State will be unable to prove that the district court's erroneous 
admission of these audio recordings as substantive evidence is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, this Court should vacate Mr. Osterhoudt's conviction. 
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F. Even If Individually Harmless, The Accumulation Of Preserved Errors In This 
Case Deprived Mr. Osterhoudt A Fair Trial, Requiring This Court To Vacate His 
Convictions · 
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Perry 150 Idaho at 
230 (citing State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994)). "However, a necessary 
predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error." Id. 
(citing State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407 (Ct. App.1998)). Each of Mr. Osterhoudt's 
claimed errors were admitted over timely objects. Thus, he asserts that the cumulative 
error doctrine should be applied in this case. See Perry, 150 Idaho 230-231 
(recognizing that the cumulative error doctrine apply only to claims of errors preserved 
by a contemporaneous objection). 
Due to the fact that the State has failed to claim that any error in any of the 
district court's rulings are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, if this Court finds that 
the district court incorrectly ruled on any of the preserved claims of error, this Court 
must vacate his conviction. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that 
where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant 
shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also 
State v. Almaraz, 2013 Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 2013) (petition for rehearing 
pending). If the Court considers a harmless error argument raised for the first time on 
review, for the reasons articulated above, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that each error was 
not individually harmless. However, even if this Court finds that these errors were 
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individually harmless, he asserts that the cumulation of the evidence that he provided 
H.O. methamphetamine, that H.O. alleged, when she was five years-old, that 
Mr. Osterhoudt had sexually abused her, and the admission of the telephone 
conversations between Mr. Osterhoudt and S.M. and Mr. Osterhoudt and Ms. Williams, 
as substantive evidence, deprived Mr. Osterhoudt of a fair trial and requires this Court 
to vacate his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Osterhoudt respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review 
and ultimately vacate his convictions and remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2014. 
JASON C.-Pli<JTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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